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 Desertion As Localism: Army Unit Solidarity
 and Group Norms in the U.S& Civil War*
 PETER S. BEARMAN, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 Abstract
 Drawing from the experiences of 3,126 enlisted men from North Carolina who fought
 for the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War, this article focuses on the determinants of
 desertion. I argue that men deserted because their identity as Southerners was eroded
 by an emergent localism, sustained and organized within the Confederate army.
 Desertion rates were highest in companies that evidenced a high degree of local
 homogeneity - company solidarity thus bred rather than reduced desertion rates. There
 is no supportfor any of the historical models of desertion that search for individual-level
 determinants, such as social class, occupation, status, family structure, age, or time of
 enlistment. Finally, contextual variables seem to be weak proxiesfor the central variable
 accounting for desertion - the emergence of a localist identity.
 Mother there is soldiers deserting every day & I hope that they will continue to desert
 until this war is ended.
 Private T.W. Gaither, April 3, 1863 (Hardy n.d.)
 In the final months of World War II, German soldiers continued to oppose the
 Allied forces despite overwhelming odds and knowledge that they faced certain
 defeat (Shils & Janowitz 1948). In Vietnam and Afghanistan, small and poorly
 supplied resistance armies ultimately defeated, in struggles that lasted for years,
 armed forces with vast material and manpower resources at their disposal. In
 marked contrast, the Confederate South, in control of resources and manpower
 that, relative to the opposing forces, were greater than those of numerous
 successful resistance movements, was overwhelmed by Union forces within 18
 months of its first major military setbacks. Why did the South lose the Civil
 War, and why did it lose so quickly?
 ?i The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, December 1991, 70(2):321-342
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 A popular answer is that the agrarian South was overwhelmed by the
 industrial North's superior capacity to harness and deploy manpower and
 material resources (Donald 1960). Contemporaries in the South may have found
 comfort in this argument, but recently many historians have focused on the
 internal conflicts arising from ideological and structural cleavages in antebellum
 Southern society as the cause of the collapse of Southern morale (Beringer et al.
 1986; Durden 1972; Escott 1978; McPherson 1982; Owsley [1925] 1961; Wiley
 1943).
 This new focus on intemal ruptures has taken numerous forms. Escott
 (1978) suggests, for example, that Confederate military policies, which exempted
 planters who owned more than 20 slaves from active service, heightened the
 nascent class conflict between the large planter aristocracy and the mass of
 yeomen farmers over the course of the war. As their standard of living declined,
 yeomen farmers increasingly came to resent the elite and the Confederacy,
 which earlier had appeared to serve their interests (Watson 1985). The poor did
 not want to fight a rich man's war while the rich stood by. Historians have also
 focused on the emergence of conflict over the issue of slavery. Beringer et al.
 (1986) suggest that as the war continued, many Southerners harbored increasing
 doubts about the justness of slavery. These doubts led men, especially those
 from outside the "slavebelt" who did not have a vested economic interest in
 slavery, to withdraw their support for the Confederacy and the war effort. Both
 arguments have a similar logic - the Civil War brought to light class an-
 tagonisms latent in antebellum Southern society and consequently crippled the
 sense of Southern identity and nationalism that flourished at secession.
 Historians have also suggested that bitter battles among the elite over state
 rights fragmented Southern nationalism (Donald 1960; Owsley [1925] 1961).
 Dissonance between the reality of a strongly centralized Confederate state and
 the ideal of state rights led some elites to withdraw their support for the war
 and to sabotage the Confederacy from within. Contemporaries did not fail to
 notice the irony of a state rights movement led by a central authority more
 powerful than the Union from which the Southern states had seceded.
 These arguments have cumulated in a new historical vision of the Civil War
 that suggests that structural and ideological cleavages undermined Confederate
 unity (Escott & Crow 1986). In the context of a weak and poorly articulated
 national identity, these nascent cleavages undermined the bases for collective
 action and lead inexorably to Northern victory. From this perspective, the South
 lost the Civil War not because the North was able to deploy more resources and
 men but because it was unable to sustain a collective identity as a Confederate
 state in the wake of structural cleavages that crosscut and eroded the bases for
 national sentiment.
 Confederates -had little to fight for, so when the going got rough, they quit.
 As Beringer et al. (1986) write:
 After three years of essentially successful defense against powerful invading forces these
 prolonged strains proved more than Confederate nationalism could bear and ...
 Confederates, by thousands of individual decisions, abandoned the struggle for and
 allegiance to the Confederate States of America.
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 The Meaning of Desertion
 This article focuses on one tangible trace of the decision to abandon the Con-
 federacy - desertion - as a way to make sense of the structure of intemal
 dissent to the war. My main goal is to induce a pattern in the desertion rate that
 will elucidate why the Confederacy unraveled so quickly. The focus is on the
 sociological rather than the historical significance of desertion. Although some
 may find this a naive distinction, I simply note that the historian is likely to
 treat desertion as an independent variable - related causally to a stream of
 events - whereas the sociologist treats desertion as a dependent variable, the
 meaning of which (beyond, of course, idiosyncratic motives of individuals) is
 revealed only through analysis of its correlates. The strategy adopted to make
 sense of desertion is similar to the one Durkheim (1951) used to understand
 suicide.
 Of course, desertion was perceived by Confederate leaders as a critical
 problem. Almost from the start of the war, Confederate leaders voiced concerns
 over high desertion rates, claiming that desertion contributed directly to military
 defeats and, worse, demoralized the home front (Lonn 1928). Their concerns
 were justified, for Southern desertions had a major impact on the Confederate
 army's ability to prosecute the war, especially after 1863. In the final months of
 fighting, about two-thirds of Lee's army disappeared from the front; and in the
 west, high desertion rates reduced Confederate troop strength well before
 Sherman's famed march to sea.
 From a sociological perspective, desertion rates provide a relatively
 straightforward metric by which one can measure, and thus interpret, the source
 and structure of internal dissent and war resistance. The pattern of desertion
 provides insight into the sudden collapse of the Confederacy. This article shows
 that a part of the new historical vision is correct, that men did abandon the
 Confederacy because an ephemeral Confederate/Southern identity unraveled.
 But rather than identify basic structural and ideological cleavages as the critical
 factors, I show that the Confederacy unraveled because old localisms that were
 nurtured within the Confederate army emerged as the central bases for identity.
 These localisms had nothing to do with class or status interests arising from
 civil society, as Escott (1978) and Beringer et al. (1986) would suggest. Nor were
 they tied to lofty issues in politics or statecraft. But the adoption of a localist
 identity did mean that soldiers stopped thinking of themselves as Southerners
 fighting a Southern cause, and when they did so, they deserted the army.
 The South lost the war largely because soldiers replaced their newfound
 Southern identity with their old local identity and thereby discovered that they
 had no reason to fight. I support this claim with an analysis of the army careers
 of over 3,000 Southerners who volunteered and fought.
 Historical and Sociological Models of Desertion
 Historians have sought to explain desertion in the Civil War by focusing on
 individual-level differences between deserters and stayers (Bardolph 1964;
 Barrett 1963; Lonn 1928; Reid 1981; Tatum 1934), yet the pattern of desertions
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 from the Confederate army shows that these models are seriously inadequate.
 There are no social characteristics at the individual level that distinguish stayers
 from deserters. This claim challenges the historical accounts of Southern
 desertion, which assert that desertion was motivated by heterogeneous interests
 arising from positions in civil society. But poor men and rich men deserted at
 the same rate as farmers, planters, laborers, and craftsmen. Neither wealth nor
 occupation was associated with higher desertion rates. Class antagonism may
 have emerged in the South during the war years, the poor may have increasing-
 ly felt that they were fighting a rich man's war, but neither class conflict nor
 feelings of resentment drove soldiers to desert. Heterogeneous individual
 interests fail to predict desertion.
 In other military contexts, desertion has historically been inversely related to
 company/unit solidarity (Shils & Janowitz 1948; Stouffer et al. 1949). Socio-
 logical models of desertion suggest that the context of service - the company
 and primary group - plays an important role in determining desertion. A main
 contribution of the sociological analyses of desertion in war thus has been to
 identify the pivotal role of social solidarity within units, which binds men into
 military society and consequently forges identity as a soldier. Theoretically, in
 units where social relations are strong, soldiers must overcome enormous social
 constraint in order to desert. Likewise, when social solidarity in the primary
 unit is weakened, each soldier is theoretically freed from constraint and may
 pursue individual rather than group ends. In this sense, desertion is kin to
 apostasy, for just as the true believer is at greatest risk to apostasy when
 isolated from other believers, the individual soldier is at greatest risk to
 desertion when the primary groups in military society are weak and disag-
 gregated. The absence of social solidarity within the primary group largely
 facilitates desertion.
 The pattern of desertion from the Confederate army suggests only limited
 support for this sociological model. At the start of the war, desertion rates were,
 as the prevailing model would predict, greatest in highly heterogeneous
 companies, where social solidarity was lowest. But in the last two years of the
 war, men serving in companies with strong solidarity were significantly more
 likely to desert than men serving in heterogeneous companies. The positive
 association between social solidarity and desertion in the latter stages of the war
 is an unexpected result that provides insight into the process of identity
 formation and resistance to the war.
 Over 12% (14,000) of the 110,000 men from North Carolina who served in
 the Confederate army deserted (Manarin & Jordan 1966-1988).1 This rate was
 comparable to or lower than the rate for soldiers from other Confederate states.2
 These soldiers must have had good reasons for leaving, but I show that
 desertion and individual interests are not related. Nor does desertion appear to
 be the response of anomic men to a crumbling social structure, as has been the
 case in other wars.
 Despite these negative claims, we can understand Confederate desertions by
 focusing on the context of service, defined by the intersection of county of
 origin and company of destination. This analysis suggests a new model of the
 structural bases for the collapse of Southern morale. Desertion was driven by
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 the resurgence of localist identities that the Confederate policy of coupling
 military and civil society organized and sustained.
 Civil and Military Society
 In wars, soldiers must assume risks in pursuit of collective goals that they
 would not pursue in everyday life. To gain compliance to command, armies
 must create a context in which the collective end (shooting people to gain
 control of a hill) is experienced as an individual end. This requires social
 solidarity. The norms governing social action must be shared. As we know,
 social relations are funnels through which norms flow. The basis of social
 solidarity in many primary groups, especially the army, is homogeneity of
 alters. In the modern army, homogeneity is induced by decoupling civil and
 military society;3 company solidarity is a by-product of this separation.
 Ideally, men enter the army and soldiers exit the army. For this to occur,
 civil and military society must be decoupled; identity must be switched from
 one to the other. Various mechanisms of social control facilitate this shift: boot
 camp, the administration of collective sanctions and rewards at the company
 level, forced structural equivalence of individuals within ranks, and the
 transposability of soldiers from one setting to another are the most important
 (Heckathorn 1988). However achieved, the separation of civil and military
 society is fundamental to the creation of unit solidarity. By erasing traces of civil
 society as markers distinguishing individuals, the army induces homogeneity
 from a heterogeneous pool of recruits. The modern army thus resists the
 potentially disaggregative pressures of individual ends by eclipsing individua-
 tion.
 Unlike modem armies, which seek to strip recruits of ties to civil society
 upon their enlistment to more fully embed them in the social world of the
 military, Civil War armies tried to induce social solidarity by the tight coupling
 of military and civil society. Thus, each company was organized within one
 county, and soldiers volunteered to serve with other men from their local area
 - many of them neighbors and kin. Even command was localist in orientation.
 Local elites organizing the company were placed in command and mustered in
 with the men they mobilized. The model army was an aggregation of separate
 local militias.
 In the early years of the war, civil and military society remained tightly
 linked. But institutional pressures resulting from mortalities and exits led to the
 slow abandonment of the policy of coupling local communities with particular
 military units. As the war continued, many Confederate companies became
 increasingly heterogeneous with respect to their county of origin. Differences in
 the extent of heterogeneity and homogeneity of companies allow us to evaluate
 the role of social solidarity in inducing desertion.
 The desertion rate in the heterogeneous companies was lower, especially
 following the summer of 1863, than that of more homogeneous companies. And
 in the final two years of the war, desertion from the Confederacy was associated
 with increased company solidarity; the more localist the company, the higher
 the desertion rate. The Confederate strategy of tightly coupling military society
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 and civil society appears to have undermined the capacity of the South to
 prosecute the war. Identities shaped in antebellum civil society resurfaced
 toward the end of the war, replacing the Confederate/Southern identity that
 had emerged in 1861 and that had initially propelled men into war.
 Organization
 I test interest-based theories of desertion that have been proposed by historians.
 These models assume that men deserted their companies to pursue interests in
 civil society, and they seek to identify similarities in the social backgrounds of
 deserters in order to impute motive. After rejecting these models, I test an
 identity-based model of desertion. First, I describe the data and sample and
 then discuss possible sources of selection bias that may confound the results
 presented.
 Data Sources and Sample Design
 The sample consists of 3,126 volunteer soldiers residing in North Carolina in
 1860 and serving in Confederate regiments organized under North Carolina's
 authority. For each soldier, the following information is available from North
 Carolina Troops, 1861-1865: A Roster: name, age, county of birth and residence,
 date of and rank at enlistment, date(s) of desertion, promotion, imprisonment,
 whether the soldier was ever wounded, whether he was ever absent, and cause
 of death (Manarin & Jordan 1966-1988). Since soldiers were paid every two
 months, a fairly reliable count of soldiers and events was recorded six times a
 year through late 1864. After 1864, the quality of the data declines considerably
 and dates of events are less reliable, with a four- to six-month margin of error.4
 I attempted to find a record of each soldier included in the sample in the
 1860 federal census for North Carolina (U.S Bureau of the Census 1860). The
 manuscript census includes the name, age, literacy status, value of real and
 personal estate, gender, race, and occupation of each individual enumerated.
 Men were linked on the basis of name, age, county of birth, and county of
 residence. The structure of the 1860 manuscript census allows the researcher to
 reconstruct families within households. Every effort was made to reconstruct the
 families from which the sampled soldiers came, making the family of origin the
 primary domestic unit analyzed. By linking the data collected on soldiers from
 their compiled service records to the 1860 manuscript census, an individual-
 level data set was created that combines social characteristics of men and the
 events they experienced.
 The full data set consists of sampled individuals drawn from the North
 Carolina troop rosters (Manarin & Jordan 1966-1988). In analyses where a
 desertion rate is calculated, the full sample is used. Analyses in which
 individual social-background characteristics are treated as independent variables
 -in order to model the determinants of desertion - the sample is reduced to
 soldiers who could be unambiguously located in the 1860 census. This popula-
 tion is referred to as the linked sample.
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 SAMPLE DESIGN
 The full sample is a random probability sample of 10% of all enlisted men
 serving in 208 randomly selected companies, men whose age and county of
 birth or county of residence were reported when they enlisted. Within each
 company, the sample was stratified by year of enlistment.5 As noted above, the
 full sample consists of 3,126 soldiers. Since 72.9% of the men in the full sample
 were linked to the 1860 manuscript census, the linked sample consists of 2,279
 men.6 This sample (N=2,279) is used to evaluate the individual-level theories of
 desertion. To evaluate the more detailed contextual hypotheses proposed,
 especially the role of neighborhood on desertion, service data for all soldiers
 ever serving in companies A or B of the 39th Regiment were gathered. Over
 90% of these soldiers were linked to the 1860 census. These men are analyzed
 separately and not included in the linked sample analyses.
 SAMPLE SELECIIVIIY
 The proportion of men found in the 1860 manuscript census is exceedingly high
 in comparison to other historical studies using census data. The main reason for
 such a high linkage rate is that all the men lived in North Carolina at
 enlistment, and all of them reported counties of residence or birth that were
 largely accurate guides to their residence at enlistment. Nevertheless, there may
 be reason to be concerned that selection bias could confound the results of this
 analysis.
 Consider first biases resulting from an underenumeration of the census. The
 best available estimate is that the 1860 census in North Carolina under-
 enumerated about 10% of the white population, a rate comparable to or lower
 than underenumeration in the U.S as a whole. As they are today, the causes of
 underenumeration are poverty and mobility. Both poverty and mobility rates
 are thought to have been higher in mountain counties during the period studied
 (Kenzer 1987), but no evidence supports regional bias in the probability of a link
 to the 1860 census. Likewise, the proportion of landless men in the linked
 sample (40-50%) parallels estimates of the proportion of landless men in the
 South (Gallman 1970; Soltow 1975; Yang 1984). Selectivity resulting from
 underenumeration of the 1860 census seems minimal (Bode & Ginter 1986).
 Two other possible sources of selectivity bias are age and enlistment year.
 Young men may have pretended to be older at the point of enlistment; older
 men may have been unable to correctly report their year of birth. Misreports of
 age on the muster roles would make a link to the census difficult. In Table 1
 (panel A) I report linkage rates for enlistment year by age cohorts. There is no
 significant association between age at enlistment and the rate of linkage to the
 1860 census, although older men (at enlistment) are somewhat less likely to be
 found than younger men. Likewise, enlistment year could introduce some
 sample-selectivity bias. Since the census was taken in 1860, we would expect
 that late enlistees would be harder to locate in the census than those who
 enlisted earlier, simply because more time had elapsed between the census and
 enlistment. Table 1 (panel B) shows the linkage rates for regions by year of
 enlistment. Note that regional differences in linkage rates are small across all
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 TABLE 1: Proportion of Soldiers Linked to the 1860 Census
 Panel A: By Age and Enlistment Year
 Enlistment Year
 1861 1862 1863+ Total
 N % N % N % N %
 Age
 < 17 62 (86.1) 32 (91.4) 5 (100.0) 99 (88.4)
 17-19 296 (76.7) 179 (73.9) 103 (79.2) 578 (75.9)
 20-24 423 (69.9) 183 (64.2) 31 (91.1) 637 (68.9)
 25-29 185 (73.7) 176 (74.6) 22 (52.4) 383 (72.4)
 30-34 100 (74.1) 102 (63.7) 22 (75.8) 224 (69.8)
 35+ 104 (74.8) 96 (69.1) 157 (78.1) 357 (74.5)
 Total 1,170 (73.7) 768 (70.0) 340 (77.1) 2,278 (72.9)
 Panel B: By Region and Enlistment Year
 Enlistment Year
 1861 1862 1863+ Total
 N % N % N % N %
 Region
 Mountains 262 (68.8) 133 (72.1) 55 (73.7) 450 (72.1)
 Lower piedmont 211 (78.7) 191 (66.0) 108 (81.5) 510 (73.7)
 Piedmont 255 (70.0) 192 (72.8) 101 (64.7) 548 (71.5)
 Coastal plain 326 (77.1) 196 (66.7) 51 (82.4) 573 (73.2)
 Coast 116 (73.9) 56 (90.1) 25 (78.1) 197 (75.5)
 Total 1,170 (73.7) 768 (70.0) 340 (77.1) 2,278 (72.9)
 five regions, the rates varying by only 3%, and enlistment year is not statistical-
 ly associated with the probability of a link to the 1860 census (X2=2.01, df=3).
 Selectivity is meaningful if the underlying selection occurs on a dimension
 associated with the dependent variable. Concern about bias resulting from
 poverty or age is reasonable because these are critical factors in the received
 historical accounts of desertion. Likewise, since enlistees after 1862 were subject
 to conscription if they did not volunteer first, they may have a different
 sentiment pool than those who enlisted earlier. No evidence suggests that the
 sample is biased with respect to these two variables (Downs 1982; Goff 1987).
 Comparing across regions - using region as a proxy measure for differen-
 tial embeddedness in the community - there is little evidence that the linked
 and full samples differ significantly in the proportion of deserters. As reported
 in Table 2, both samples have nearly the same proportion of deserters; the
 probability of finding a deserter appears largely independent of differential
 embeddedness in the community.
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 TABLE 2: Proportion of Men Linked to the 1860 Census, by Region
 Mountains Lower Piedmont Coastal Coast Total
 Piedmont Plain
 All men
 Full sample 624 692 766 783 261 3,126
 Linked sample 450 510 548 573 197 2,278
 Percent 72.1 73.7 71.5 73.2 75.5 72.9
 Deserters
 Full sample 153 26 76 86 39 380
 Linked sample 103 11 55 63 53 265
 Percent 67.6 41.1 72.5 73.7 84.6 69.9
 Desertion rate
 Full sample (%) 24.5 3.7 10.0 11.0 14.9 12.2
 Linked sample (%) 22.9 2.2 10.0 11.0 16.8 11.6
 Note that in three of the five regions - mountains, piedmont, and coastal
 plain - deserters are as likely as stayers to be found in the 1860 census,
 whereas coastal deserters are more likely and deserters from the lower
 piedmont less likely to be found than stayers. Since the number of deserters
 from the lower piedmont is so small, establishing significance is difficult. I
 conclude from these data and other tests of sources of bias that selectivity
 effects resulting from record linkage are minimal.
 CODING DESERI[ON
 The apparently trivial question of classification - what is desertion - presents
 extremely thorny problems. As with suicide data, desertions are classified as
 such by others after the fact. According to the army, soldiers absent from their
 company without official leave for more than 60 days were classified as
 deserters. Men who were absent for fewer than 60 days were classified as
 AWOL. However, in many units, soldiers were carried on the company rolls as
 AWOL for the duration of the war, while in other companies the missing
 soldier would be classified as a deserter before the end of the 60-day AWOL
 period. Men classified as deserters were as likely to return to service as men
 classified as AWOL. Given substantial variance across companies, all soldiers
 classified as AWOL or as deserters are treated as deserters.
 More complicated are soldiers who deserted through voluntary capture.
 These soldiers were coded as being captured, unless they subsequently
 renounced their positions in the Confederate army and swore allegiance to the
 Union, in which case they were coded as deserters. A large number of men are
 reported as "falling out of a march," but I did not code these men as deserters.
 The determinants of capture and desertion are different, but the deter-
 minants of desertion and AWOL are similar, which suggests that the restrictive
 classification is appropriate for understanding the purposeful withdrawal of
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 support for the war. Therefore, I focus on men whose actions were
 unambiguous to those whose job it was to keep track of loyalists and traitors.
 INDWIDUAL-LEVEL ACCOUNTS OF DESERTION IN THE CIVIL WAR
 In this section I test interest-based accounts of desertion. The accounts tested are
 drawn from the historical literature and are reported as a series of hypotheses
 that cluster into three streams: economic hardship, family responsibility, and
 prior sentiment theories. Each cluster articulates aspects of the more general
 accounts of the collapse of the Confederacy. The economic hardship models
 focus directly on the role of class antagonism - predicting that desertion is
 associated with poverty and economic need. The family responsibility hypo-
 theses suggest an interaction between class and family structure and argue that
 the experience of hardship was mediated by household and family composition.
 The prior sentiment models attempt to test more directly sentiment in favor of
 the Confederacy and the war effort. These hypotheses are reported below.
 Economic Hardship Theories
 Hypothesis 1. Desertion reflected recognition that the Civil War was a rich man's war and
 a poor man's fight and that a Southern victory would benefit only the elite. All other
 things being equal, poor men were more likely than rich men to desert (Auman 1988;
 Bardolph 1964; Lonn 1928; Reid 1981).
 Hypothesis 2. Farmers were more likely than other occupational groups to desert because
 they were subject to the greatest hardships (Lonn 1928; Reid 1981; Tatum 1934).
 Hypothesis 3. Farmer desertions were clustered during harvesting and planting seasons,
 when labor demands were acute (Auman 1988; Bardolph 1964; Lonn 1928).
 Family Responsibility Theories
 Hypothesis 4. Desertion reflected differential family responsibilities. Men with young
 dependent children at home were more likely to desert than those without young
 dependent children (Bardolph 1964; Lonn 1928; Reid 1981).
 Hypothesis 5. Net of regional differences, dependent children in female-headed households
 were more likely to desert than those in male-headed households (Reid 1981).
 Hypothesis 6. Older men were more likely than younger men to desert, all things being
 equal, since they were responsible for their families (Reid 1981).
 Prior Sentiment Theories
 Hypothesis 7. Late enlistees enlisted to prevent conscription, rather than from loyalty to the
 Southern cause. All things being equal, deserters were more likely than nondeserters to
 have enlisted later (Bardolph 1964; Lonn 1928; Honey 1986).
 Hypothesis 8. Deserters deserted because they were cowards (Lonn 1928; Reid 1981).
 Note that the predicted deserter is a late-enlisting, poor, cowardly farmer with
 dependent children at home.
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 TABLE 3: Variables, Operationalizations, and Sources
 Measurement
 Desertion Coded 1 if deserted or AWOL, 0 otherwise (Manarin & Jordan
 1965-1988).
 Region North Carolina is partitioned into five geographic regions that
 differ with respect to soil type, proportion black, proportion
 market agriculture, proportion slaveholder, and agricultural mode
 of production. Most work on North Carolina uses a similar
 partition. Coded as mountains, lower piedmont, piedmont, coastal
 plain, coast.
 Enlistment date Logged enlistment date (Manarin & Jordan 1965-1988).
 Wealth Dollar value of real estate owned by household heads. If depen-
 dent, dollar value of real estate owned by the household head
 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1860).
 Household head Head of household or dependent. Coded 1 if head of household, 0
 if dependent child. Men living away from their family of origin (or
 destination) are coded as dependents (U.S. Bureau of the Census
 1860).
 Age Age at enlistment (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1860).
 Occupation Partitioned into five unordered categories: farmer, farm laborer,
 professional, skilled laborer/craftsman, unknown (U.S. Bureau of
 the Census 1860).
 Female-headed Coded 1 if dependent child resided in a female-headed household,
 household 0 otherwise. Boys living away from their family of origin were
 coded 0 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1860).
 Birth order Coded 1 if eldest son, 0 if younger son. Only sons were classified
 as eldest sons (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1860).
 Dependents Number of dependents under the age of 12 living in the home of
 soldiers who were head of household (U.S. Bureau of the Census
 1860).
 Cowardice Tenure in months from enlistment to desertion (Manarin & Jordan
 1966-1988).
 MEASUREMENT
 Table 3 reports variables, operationalizations, and sources for each variable used
 to evaluate the hypotheses listed above. Figure 1 is a map of North Carolina
 showing regions as they are defined in this article.
 Results of a logistic regression of desertion as a dependent variable are
 reported in Table 4. From this table, one can see that net of regional effects,
 which are pronounced, no individual-level characteristic is statistically or
 substAntively associated with desertion. These data do not support the economic
 hardship or family responsibility hypotheses (hypotheses 1 through 4). Region,
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 FIGURE 1: North Carolina Regions, 1860
 REGION
 r] |Coast rZ] Lower Piedmont Mountains
 111111 ICoastal Plains Piedmont
 used as a control, is the only variable associated with desertion. For example,
 soldiers from the mountains (in 1860) are nine times as likely to desert than
 men living in the lower piedmont, and more than four times as likely to desert
 than men from the coastal plain (slavebelt), piedmont, or coast. Net of region,
 no coefficient is even close to statistical significance. The only one that appears
 close to substantive significance is farm laborer: relative to farmers, farm
 laborers were twice as likely to desert (prob.=.089). Controlling for wealth, this
 result appears to reflect differential embeddedness in a community arising from
 control over land, suggesting that deserters were less embedded than stayers in
 local communities, but the relationship is weak. Interpreting these results is a
 tenuous activity at best.
 Wealth is not associated with desertion. Soldiers with small holdings and
 those with substantial holdings deserted at the same rate, all other things being
 equal. Neither economic hardship nor class bitterness played a role in deter-
 mining desertion.
 The family responsibility hypotheses fare no better than the economic
 hardship theories. Age at enlistment is not related to desertion. Younger sons
 are more likely to desert than firstborn sons, but the relationship is not
 significant. Some evidence suggests that dependents from female-headed
 households may have been less likely to desert than dependents from house-
 holds headed by males. Heads of households are twice as likely to desert than
 dependents (prob.=.119). While not statistically significant, this relationship
 appears to be stronger than many others. The number of dependents in the
 household is not related to the probability of desertion. Thus, family respon-
 sibility arguments are not supported by these results.
 Relative to soldiers enlisting during the first month of the war, later
 enlistees are slightly more likely to desert, net of age and service tenure.
 Preexisting antiwar sentiment reflected by delayed enlistment is not associated
 with desertion. The late volunteers may have been less enthusiastic about war
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 TABLE 4: Logistic Regression of Desertion: Individual Attributes
 p Std. Error x2 Prob R
 Intercept -1.540 .544 8.02 .005
 Lower piedmont -2.630 .542 23.52 .000 -.185
 Piedmont -.876 .297 8.68 .003 -.103
 Coastal plain -.944 .292 10.38 .001 -.116
 Coast -.511 .292 1.73 .188 .000
 Enlistment date -.105 .146 .51 .473 .000
 Wealth -.000 .000 1.14 .285 .000
 Household head .464 .297 2.44 .119 .026
 Age .010 .017 .40 .528 .000
 Farm laborer .499 .288 2.89 .089 .038
 Skilled laborer .372 .438 .72 .396 .000
 Professional .011 .594 .00 .984 .000
 Unknown -.698 .462 2.30 .130 -.022
 Female-headed household -.159 .140 1.28 .258 .000
 Birth order .017 .013 1.22 .269 .000
 than the men who enlisted before them, but they were not more likely to desert
 as a result of their prior beliefs. Thus, hypothesis 7 is rejected.
 Net of region, no single individual-level attribute is strongly associated with
 desertion. Theories of desertion that derive their energy from variances in
 individual characteristics - and use these variances to impute differences in
 interest - are clearly falsified by these results. Also, these data do not support
 the new historical models that suggest that structural cleavages crosscut and
 corroded an ephemeral Southern nationalism.
 Temporal Variation
 The idea that there was substantial variation in the timing of desertion in the
 Civil War has provided grist for a number of mills. A classic account of
 Confederate deserters is that they were poor subsistence farmers who left the
 front to tend to the family farm during planting and harvesting seasons
 (Bardolph 1964; Lonn 1928). This oddly romantic theory is also falsified. As
 shown above, poverty is not associated with desertion. Likewise, there are no
 obvious seasonal effects. Table 5 reports the seasonal distribution of desertions
 for all men, for farmers and farm laborers, and for farmers and farm laborers
 who returned to their companies after deserting or being listed as AWOL. Men
 deserting in the spring or fall may have worked on their farm, but the seasonal
 pattern of desertion does not support the theory that desertion was motivated
 by the seasonal demands of agriculture. Desertion was independent of season.
 Thus, hypothesis 3 is rejected.
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 TABLE 5: Proportion of Soldiers Deserting, by Season, 1861-1865
 Spring Summer Fall Winter
 Category
 All soldiers 23.8 25.4 26.3 22.9
 Farmers and farm laborers 19.7 26.6 28.8 24.9
 Returning farmers 21.3 25.9 27.4 25.4
 Service Tenures
 Patterns in service tenures prior to desertion may help support a theory of
 motivation. Historians have suggested that desertion may reflect cowardice
 (Lonn 1928; Tatum 1934). I do not know how to measure this concept. One
 strategy is to search for a positive association between company desertion rates
 and company mortality rates: quarterly company mortality does not predict
 desertion in the subsequent quarter. A second strategy is to focus on variance
 in lengths of service prior to desertion: mean tenure of stayers did not differ
 significantly from that of deserters (25 months vs. 19 months). Because service
 tenures of stayers and deserters are so similar, I reject the hypothesis that
 deserters were cowards. Note that the fact that the mean tenure for deserters is
 an artifact of their desertion (if they had not deserted, they would have served
 longer) does not undermine rejection of hypothesis 8.
 Interestingly, soldiers deserting within the first year of enlistment differ
 very little from soldiers with longer tenures who deserted. Net of age, no
 individual attribute predicts the timing of desertion. Enlistment year, literacy,
 the dollar value of real estate, occupation, the number of dependents at home,
 the number of siblings at home, female-headed household, personal wealth, and
 birth order are not significantly associated with length of service prior to
 desertion. Mean tenures appear to be associated with age, but all we can see
 from this association is that boys who deserted were braver than men who
 deserted.
 These results reject every individual-level hypothesis proposed to account
 for Southern desertion in the Civil War. Stayers and deserters look very similar
 with respect to class, occupation, age, family composition, and enlistment date.
 Interest as structured by the occupancy of differential positions in civil society
 cannot account for desertion. It would be hard to defend an interest-based
 theory of motivation based on these marginal results.
 Contextual Determinants of Desertion
 Knowledge about individual social-background characteristics is not useful for
 understanding desertion in the war. On the other hand, a number of contextual
 variables appear important as determinants of desertion. In this section, I start
 with broad contexts - region, county group, and county - and then focus on
 more proximate contexts in which men experienced the war - company of
 destination and community of origin. From this analysis, I identify a general
 contextual variable, localism, and show its strong effect on desertion rates.
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 REGIONAL AND COUNTY-GROUP EFFECTS
 Consider first the overwhelming regional differences in the desertion rate as
 reported in Table 4. All other variables being equal, soldiers from the mountains
 were more than four times as likely to desert than soldiers from any of the
 other regions. On the other extreme, the desertion rate for enlisted soldiers from
 the lower piedmont, the area bordering South Carolina, was fully three times
 less than the state average. In the coastal plain (slavebelt), where support for
 slavery might logically be presumed to be widespread, men deserted at roughly
 the state average. Historians have developed numerous compelling arguments
 explaining the regional effects on desertion in the South in general and North
 Carolina in particular. These tend to focus on a cluster of interrelated ideo-
 logical, economic, and social factors that are regionally distributed (Bardolph
 1964; Lonn 1928; Reid 1981).
 Bardolph (1964) argues, for example, that regional variation of the impor-
 tance of slavery in North Carolina accounts for the observed differences in the
 desertion rate. Operationalizing county embeddedness in the slave economy as
 the proportion of the white population owning slaves, following Auman (1988),
 no association is found between county desertion rates and county involvement
 in the slave economy. Other measures fare poorly as well; neither proportion
 black nor the average size of each slaveholding is associated with county-
 specific desertion rates. At best, these variables account for less than 2% of the
 variance.
 Regional variation in the proportion of slave owners yields an uneven
 pattern. The high desertion rate in the mountains is associated with a lower
 slave-ownership rate (less than 3% of the white population owned slaves) -
 suggesting some support for the argument that desertion rates were highest in
 areas where slavery was least important - but this association does not hold
 for the coast. In the coastal plain, where the proportion of slave owners is close
 to 10%, the desertion rate was almost three times higher than that of the lower
 piedmont, where only 7% of the white population owned slaves (U.S. Bureau of
 the Census 1860).
 Nor is it clear why there should be a relationship between slave-ownership
 and desertion rates. In 1860, the average price paid at auction for an adult slave
 was $1,800 (Taylor 1926). At the same time, the typical adult head of household
 controlled assets valued under $500 in combined real and personal wealth (U.S.
 Bureau of the Census 1860). Well over 90% of enlisted men owned no slaves,
 had no hope of purchasing one,7 and were not directly embedded in the slave
 economy.
 Reid (1981) argues that the political and ideological traditions of each region
 are crucial elements in determining the likelihood of desertion. As election
 returns indicate, men living in the mountains were more likely than men from
 any of the other regions (particularly the piedmont or the coastal plain) to vote
 Republican in both local and national elections. Prior to secession, Unionist
 sentiment was more widespread and stronger in the western mountain region
 than in the eastern regions of the state (Crawford 1989; Kruman 1983).
 While Union sentiment was widespread in the more Republican mountains,
 it does not necessarily follow that the general diffusion of pro-Union sentiment
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 in the west can account for the high rate of desertion. One indicator of support
 for the war is the proportion of early enlisters. In the mountains, a greater
 proportion of men enlisted in the early years of the war than did men from the
 lower piedmont, where the desertion rate was extremely low (Crawford 1989;
 Reid 1981).
 Support for the war in Ashe County (in the mountains) was overwhelming
 once North Carolina seceded, despite powerful Unionist political sentiment
 (Crawford 1989). Nor can one observe either abnormally low enlistment rates or
 abnormally high desertion rates in other areas outside the mountains, where
 Republicanism was strong (Kenzer 1987). As Crawford's study of Ashe County
 suggests, men did not distinguish between purely local and national politics.
 Secession and war mobilized men as Southerners and gave them an identity
 broader than the local community, but for many it held only a fleeting reality
 (Crawford 1989).
 Regional differences in desertion rates correspond somewhat to expected
 patterns, lending credence to a model of crosscutting cleavages in a nascent
 nationalism as core determinants of the withdrawal of war support. But the
 relationships fall apart at the county level, suggesting that desertion was in
 other ways uniquely localist. Understanding desertion may require that one
 consider how community effects were mediated through the army-company
 context. Company solidarity emerges as the key element.
 LOCAL1St COWANY SOLIDARr, HOMOGENE1TY, AND DESERTION
 I consider the desertion rate over time - from 1861 to the end of the war - in
 relation to company homogeneity and define homogeneity with respect to
 county of origin, such that companies composed of men from only one county
 are homogeneous and companies composed of men from many different
 counties are heterogeneous. In Table 6, 1 report the number of desertions across
 selected periods of the war for companies categorized by degree of homo-
 geneity.
 For each observed desertion in the sample, I derive a measure of company
 heterogeneity for the month the desertion occurred. Thus, Table 6 reports the
 number of desertions that occurred in each period by the time-specific com-
 pany-heterogeneity context in which the desertion occurred. Since company
 heterogeneity was a product of prior events within the company - mortalities
 and desertions, new recruits and absences - companies did not retain a given
 heterogeneity score across all months of the war.
 Cell entries in Table 6 indicate the raw number and the row and column
 proportion of desertions for companies arrayed by their heterogeneity at the
 time of desertion. Reading across the first row, which reports desertions for the
 most heterogeneous companies, note that the proportion of men who desert
 decreases over time from 41% during months 1-18 to 14% and 7% during
 months 31-42 and 43-50, respectively. In contrast, note that the pattern of
 desertions in homogeneous companies, reported in the third row, is the reverse.
 Over the course of the war, desertions in homogeneous companies increase
 markedly, from 21% in the first 18 months to 58% in the last period. This
 reversal is more striking given that, as reported in the last row, the proportion
 of homogeneous companies decreased, from 64% to 29%, over the four years of
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 TABLE 6: Company Heterogeneity and Desertions, by Period'
 Desertion Months
 Heterogeneity 1-18 19-24 25-30 31-42 43-50 Total
 High (.5 to .72)
 N 16 12 10 6 4 48
 Row percent 33 25 21 12 8
 Column percent 41 33 20 14 7
 Medium (.25 to .49)
 N 15 16 17 16 13 77
 Row percent 19 21 22 21 17
 Column percent 38 44 34 37 32
 Low (O to .25)
 N 8 8 23 21 23 83
 Row percent 9 9 28 25 28
 Column percent 21 22 46 49 58
 Total 39 36 50 43 40 208
 Percent 19 17 24 20 19
 Percent Homogeneous 64 55 38 31 29 157
 a Heterogeneity - I -(a/Z9 + (bz)2 + (4Z)2.. .1. where a,b,c ... represent the
 number of men in each company from a given county, and z represents the
 number of men in the company (Finke & Stark 1988).
 the war. The pattern of increasing desertions over time in homogeneous
 companies is statistically significant at the .005 level (X2=23.64, df=8).
 A clear interpretation of these data is that early deserters typically deserted
 heterogeneous companies and late deserters deserted homogeneous companies.
 This finding is not predicted by the classical sociological models of desertion
 that maintain that solidarity within the primary unit uniformly conditions
 desertion (Shils & Janowitz 1948). At the start of the war, Confederate deserters
 - unlike their counterpart stayers - were disproportionately egoistic, serving
 in companies without ties to other men from their county. The absence of these
 ties severed commitment to the army. Companies most distant from civil society
 had the highest desertion rates.
 Yet toward the second half of the war, increased solidarity yielded an
 increased desertion rate. Solidarity in homogeneous companies tightly coupled
 with local county society articulated localist identity in opposition to the Con-
 federate ideal. By fall 1863, the tight coupling of civil and military society
 motivated desertion. Ironically, companies composed of men who had the
 longest tenures, who were the most experienced, and who had the greatest
 solidarity were most likely to have the highest desertion rates after 1863.
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 Erosion of support for the war, at home and on the front, must have
 generated this pattern. Men who were still tied to civil society and who, by
 virtue of those ties, were able to resist a military identity, were more likely to
 view themselves as members of civil society and consequently to desert. Here
 we see the process of identity formation, where men still bound to civil society
 used these ties to propel them out of service. On the other hand, soldiers
 serving in heterogeneous companies, stripped of close ties to civil society, were
 more completely bound into military society and consequently less likely to
 renounce the command structure of the army. By the end of 1863, stayers were
 egoistic men serving time in an increasingly disaggregated social structure.
 NEIGHBORHOOD UNDERLYING COUNTY AS BASIS FOR LOCALISM
 In 1860, most counties in North Carolina had a white population under 10,000.
 Still, counties were large spatial units, and we should consider whether social
 relations were organized at the county level or if neighborhood effects underlay
 the county effects reported in Table 6. To assess neighborhood effects on
 desertion, I developed a supplementary saturated sample of all men serving in
 two companies drawing recruits mainly from Jackson and Macon counties in the
 mountains.8
 In addition to the variables discussed above, I recorded the household
 number of each household as reported in the census. Men who gathered the
 census walked across each county, stopping at all households. Although error
 is possible if the census taker took a circuitous path, I assume that households
 with sequential census numbers were spatially close (Kenzer 1987). Households
 in named communities were almost always listed sequentially. If neighborhood
 underlies county as the source of social solidarity, late deserters are expected to
 be clustered into spatially close households. Early deserters ought to be spatially
 disjoint.
 Table 7 (panels A and B) reports for companies A and B the neighborhoods
 of men in the census and the number of early (April 1861 to June 1863) and late
 guly 1863 to the end of the war in 1865) deserters for each community. Each cell
 shows the number of stayers, early deserters, and late deserters for a cluster of
 households.
 These data suggest that the households of late deserters are clustered in a
 few communities, whereas early-deserter households are dispersed. Note that
 the communities of households numbered 279-368 and 754-897 in company B
 provide over 87% (14/16) of the late deserters, compared to 43% (3/7) of the
 early deserters. In company A, all the late deserters were from two com-
 munities, whereas the early deserters were more evenly dispersed. Although
 limited to two cases, these data strongly suggest that community neighborhoods
 underlay counties as the determinant of identity in civil society. Where local
 identities were carried into the army, the Confederacy was subject to their
 resurgence. While localism appears at the county level as a strong correlate of
 desertion, these data suggest that county (in 1860, as today) is a weak proxy for
 social solidarity. Clearly, we need more studies of the role of localism in this
 context.
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 TABLE 7: The Spatial Distribution of Deserters: Household Number in the
 1860 Census and Desertion
 Panel A: Company B, 39th Regiment
 Household Number
 1-186 187-278 279-368 369-625 626-753 754-897 Nulmber
 Deserting in
 months 1-24 2 0 1 1 2 1
 Deserting in
 months 2540 2 0 7 0 0 7
 Not deserting 13 15 8 13 16 6
 Panel B: Company A, 39th Regiment
 Household Number
 1-400 401-700 701-1100 1101-1429 Number
 Deserting in
 months 1-24 4 1 1 2
 Deserting in
 months 2540 9 0 0 5
 Not deserting 20 6 5 5
 Discussion
 Desertion is the flip side of enlistment, for just as a person may elect to leave
 civil society and enter the army, the deserter elects to leave military society and
 return home. About 80% of the men from North Carolina aged 1549 left their
 families and homes to join the Confederate army (Manarin & Jordan 1966-1988;
 U.S. Census 1860). The majority enlisted at the first opportunity in a wave of
 enthusiasm for the Southern cause. They saw themselves as Southerners and
 embraced a crusade for Southern rights.
 Most volunteered for the duration of the war believing that they would
 return home triumphantly within a year (Barrett 1963). Few had a realistic sense
 of what they would face. While on. the train taking him to the front in March
 1861, Thomas Gaither wrote his father, "We have the joliest [sic] crowd that I
 ever saw"; within two weeks he wrote his brother, "Be satisfied at home as long
 as possible for this is know [sic] place for to come. ... Ever boddy [sic] is
 anxious for this war to close" (Hardy n.d.:5-9). In less than a month he was
 anxious to leave (Hardy n.d.). Such sentiments were typical.
 After mobilization, most men experienced severe privations, serving without
 adequate food, warm clothing, and shoes for long periods of time (Barrett 1963;
 Lonn 1928). Contaminated drinking water, inadequate sanitation, and insuf-
 ficient food supplies led to epidemics that accounted for more than 50% of all
 mortalities. At the front, the war experience was worse. Even by our modern
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 standards, Civil War battles were gruesome affairs (McPherson 1988). Fully a
 third of North Carolina soldiers died in the Civil War. Not surprisingly, some
 men left early by deserting. Others may have wanted to desert but ended up as
 "stayers" who were killed in combat.
 Those who left had their reasons, or so we suspect. About 14,000 men
 deserted before the war ended, and most theories about why they deserted are
 derived from their ex post facto accounts, formed in a setting where desertion
 was nonnormative. In the historical literature, individual reasons are seen as
 motives representative of whole categories of individuals. Not surprisingly, the
 Southern rhetoric about desertion in the postwar years emphasized hardship
 and class bitterness as motives. Nor is it surprising that romantic images of the
 rebel farmer - sneaking home to plant and harvest and then returning to battle
 when needed - were as attractive to historians as they were to contemporaries,
 for these are long-standing rhetorical themes in Southern culture. Despite the
 rhetorical persuasiveness of these individual-level accounts, I have found not
 one individual-level social characteristic statistically associated with desertion.
 Nevertheless, we can distinguish stayers and deserters by examining the social
 context of desertion, because this was the concrete setting in which social
 identity was defined.
 When the war was just starting, the typical deserter served in an anomic,
 weakly integrated company. As the war dragged into the third year, soldiers
 serving in companies composed largely of men from the same county and
 neighborhoods deserted. For these men, their localist identities as members of
 civil society gained ascendancy over a competing Confederate nationalist
 identity.
 In war, soldiers are expected to sacrifice their own ends to achieve a
 collective good. In most cases, social solidarity at the unit level has been shown
 to contribute to identity as a soldier (over competing identities derived from
 memberships in civil society). But social relations are funnels through which
 norms and values of all sorts flow. Just as in factories (where social relations
 may induce workers to increase or decrease the production of goods), in armies
 unit solidarity may induce greater commitment to army goals, but not neces-
 sarily. If the collective is defined on a basis different from the military, soldiers
 may pursue ends quite different from those expected.
 The irony of the Civil War for the Confederacy is that the tightly localist
 social organization of the army - which induced mass mobilization in response
 to powerful community sentiments - led to desertion as the impact of fighting
 a losing war began to be experienced at home and on the front. The same
 localisms that first drew men into the Confederate army later drew them away
 from the Southern cause and back toward home.
 Notes
 1. If not otherwise cited, all facts about soldiers from North Carolina reported here are developed
 by the author and refer to conclusions generalized from the unlinked and linked sample.
 2. For most Southern states, data are not available to directly estimate the desertion rate for their
 troops. Comparing the rate of desertions to mortalities by states is possible, however. With this
 metric, North Carolina has one of the lowest desertion rates, second only to South Carolina.
 Desertion was highest (relative to mortality) in the western Confederacy - Arkansas, Alabama,
 and Texas, for example.
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 3. This process occurred in early bureaucracies that were staffed by individuals who had no social
 relations with other men in civil society. The classkcal bureaucracies were staffed by slaves and
 eunuchs, both socially dead. More modern bureaucracies induce loyalty with more subtlety. Clerics
 renounce ties to civil society through celibacy, and modern bureaucracies separate the ownership
 of an office from its administration (Patterson 1982; Weber 1978).
 4. After 1864, the quality of the data reported in the troop rosters declines considerably. Where no
 information on a soldier appears, I presume that he was present until the end of the war.
 5. Fewer than 20% of the men enlisting after 1864 had county of residence or age reported at
 enlistment. Since linkage to the census was in large part determined by these two characteristics,
 only soldiers with these identifiers were sampled for the 1864-1865 enlistment cohorts. There is no
 reason to suspect that this shift in sampling strategy results in any bias.
 6. There are a number of good reasons for an exceptionally high linkage rate. Unlike other
 wars, which tend to recruit from the most disadvantaged sectors of the population. 80% of the
 men from North Carolina aged 15-49 in 1860 served at sorne time during the Civil War. Since
 a wide cross-section of the population served in the army at some occasion, the probability of
 finding a soldier in a census is much greater than that associated with other wars. Second, the
 vast majority of men enumerated in the troop rosters resided in North Carolina at the tine of
 their enlistment, during the years 1861-1865. Backward linkage is associated with a greater
 probability of success than forward linkage.
 7. Another measure of county involvement in the slave economy is that of inequality in
 slaveholdings. Inequality may be operationalized as a gini index. A gini score may be interpreted
 as a measure of social cleavage. High scores are associated with greater social cleavage, since in the
 hypothetical case where one person controls all resources, the score is 1, and where all men in the
 population share equally, the score is 0. A reasonable hypothesis is that the desertion rate was
 higher in regions where inequality in slaveholding was greatest, because the social gulf between
 slaveholders and nonslaveholders was larger. Both county and regional inequality scores nmrror
 fairly closely the region-specific desertion rate, highest in the mountains (.87), followed by the coast
 (.79), coastal plain (slavebelt) (.73), piedmont (.71), and lower piedmont (.63). Most enlisted men
 did not own a slave, but in regions where slave ownership was highly skewed, the desertion rate
 was highest. Some of the regional effect may be attributed to this difference (Wright 1970).
 8. The higher linkage rate for this subsample results from the careful work of Richard Melvin, who
 has been tracking men from the 39th Regiment for years through the census.
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